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COMMENTS
TORTS--NEGLIGENCE-No LIABILITY TO PARENT FOR PHYSICAL
INJURIES INDUCED BY FEAR FOR CHILD'S SAFETY
While standing on the sidewalk across the street from their
house, plaintiff's two small children were killed by an auto driven
by defendant which, traveling at a high rate of speed, jumped
the curb and struck them down. Plaintiff witnessed the occur-
rence from her front porch and ran to them. In her action to re-
cover damages for physical injuries resulting from nervous
shock, the trial court sustained defendant's demurrer without
leave to amend. On appeal, held: affirmed. Since plaintiff had
not been imperilled, defendant had not breached any duty owed
to her, and therefore, as to plaintiff, was not negligent.,
The principal case is squarely in line with both the fact situa-
tion and the holding of the leading American case in point,
Waube v. Warrington,2 and is consistent with the trend of analo-
gous American decisions.3 The basic problem in cases of this
type is ascertaining the scope of liability. The American attitude
1. Resavage v. Davies, 86 A.2d 879 (Md. 1952).
2. 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935). The following elements of plaintiff's
position have been considered important in cases of this type, and were
present in both the principal case and the Waube case:(a) Defendant's actions were negligent, as distinguished from inten-
tional.(b) Plaintiff suffered no impact whatsoever.
(c) Plaintiff was not in any imminent peril or personal danger.Plaintiff was within sight of the accident (whether plaintiff
actually saw the occurrence, or could have seen it if she had
looked, or would have seen it if she had not fainted, has been con-
trolling in some cases).(e) Plaintiff was not a user of the highway where the accident oc-
curred but was situated on its contiguous premises.(f) Fear which induced plaintiff's injury was not for self, but for
another.
(g) Injured person was a close relative of plaintiff.(h) There was serious injury inflicted upon the victim.(i) Plaintiff suffered obvious physical injuries as a direct result of
the nervous shock and fear.3. For example, see the following cases: Cincinnati & St. Louis Ry. v.
Stewart, 24 Ind. App. 374, 56 N.E. 917 (1900); Sanderson v. Northern P.
Ry., 88 Minn. 162, 92 N.W. 542 (1902); Buchanan v. Stout, 123 App. Div.
648, 108 N.Y. Supp. 38 (2d Dep't 1908); Blessington v. Autry, 105 N.Y.S.2d
953 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Nuckles v. Tennessee Electric & Power Co., 155 Tenn.
611, 299 S.W. 775 (1927); Carey v. Pure Distributing Corp., 133 Tex. 31,
124 S.W.2d 847 (1939) ; Taylor v. Spokane, Pacific & Southern Ry., 72 Wash.
378, 130 Pac. 506 (1913) ; see Davis v. Tacoma Ry. & Power Co., 35 Wash.
203, 209, 77 Pac. 209, 211 (1904). But cf. Spearman v. McCrary 4 Ala.
App. 473, 58 So. 927 (1912) ; Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App. D~iv. 791,
148 N. Y. Supp. 39 (1st Dep't 1914).
Generally, see Note, 18 A.L.R.2d 220 (1951) and PRossER, TORTs 210
(1941).
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on this subject is clearly illustrated in the distinction which the
Maryland Supreme Court drew between the principal case and
an earlier Maryland decision, Bowman v. Williams.4 In the Bow-
man case, plaintiff, while inside his home, saw defendant's truck
crash into the basement wall of his house right below where he
was standing. He knew that his children were then playing in the
basement. Plaintiff was allowed to recover for fright, shock, and
resultant physical injuries. The court reasoned that defendant
had breached a duty owed to plaintiff, that there was no reason
to separate plaintiff's fear for himself and a fear for his children
when they both arose from the same series of events, and that
the plaintiff could recover whether his fright was for the safety
of his children or of both himself and the children. The principal
case was distinguished from the Bowman case on the ground that
in the latter there was in fact imminent danger of direct physical
injury that confronted the plaintiff, the very reason upon which
liability was denied in the former decision.5
In contrast to the American decisions, the English courts have
been more liberal in allowing recovery when similar fact situa-
tions have been presented. In the leading English case of Ham-
brook v. Stokes Bros.,6 plaintiff's deceased wife saw defendant's
truck careen around a corner of a narrow street in which she
knew her children to be walking. The trial court instructed the
jury that, if they found that the shock and death of the mother
arose from a reasonable fear of immediate injury to herself, de-
fendant was liable, but that if they found that the mother's fear
was for the safety of her children, then defendant was not liable.
On appeal it was held that if the mother suffered shock from
what she realized through her own unaided senses, as distin-
guished from what she was told by a bystander, then defendant
4. 164 Md. 397, 165 At]. 182 (1933). The court reached this decision
primarily on the basis of the English decisions discussed herein. Accord:
Frazee v. Western Dairy Products, 182 Wash: 578, 47 P.2d 1037 (1935).
5. Actually the distinction is not so easy to draw. The duty and breach
thereof was much clearer in the Bowman case, plaintiff having been the
owner of the house. In the court's opinion plaintiff in the Bowman case was
in danger, but it may be questioned if he was in fact in danger. This pre-
sents an interesting question upon which no direct comment has been found:
suppose that the plaintiff actually thinks he .was in peril, when in fact he
was not? The Bowman case seems to suggest the answer that the fear of
the plaintiff should be a reasonable one.
6. [1925] 1 K.B. 141 (1924).
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was liable,7 even though the shock was brought about by fear for
the safety of her children, and not by fear for her own safety.8
There was a dictum9 to the effect that plaintiff could have re-
covered even if she had been an unrelated bystander who feared
for the person injured. That statement was later applied and ex-
tended in Owens v. Liverpool Corp.10 There the court held that
the fear need not be for another human being and that thus the
mourners in a funeral procession (whose relationship to the de-
ceased varied from mother to a husband of a cousin) could re-
cover for fright and shock caused when, due to defendant's negli-
gence, the casket was overturned. In the most recent English
decision, however, the scope of liability has been limited to the
extent that a plaintiff who only heard the crash in which defen-
dant was killed, who admitted that she entertained no fear of
personal injury, who was outside of the zone of peril, and who
was unrelated to the deceased, was not permitted to recover."
In the rationales of these cases, the courts have used such
words as duty, proximate cause, foreseeability, remoteness, rea-
sonable risk of harm. One typical argument is phrased thus: In
order for the defendant to be negligent as to the plaintiff, the
defendant must have breached a duty owing to the plaintiff, and
7. It was not clear from the facts of the case whether the injury to
plaintiff's wife was brought about solely by what she realized through her
own unaided senses, in which case there would have been recovery under the
rationale set forth above, or whether it was caused by what she learned by
oral communication from bystanders, in which case there would not have
been recovery under that rationale. The case was sent back for a new trial
to resolve that factual issue but was apparently settled out of court.
8. The development of the English law up to the Hambrook decision may
be traced through the following cases: Victorian Railways Commissioners
v. Coultas, 13 A.C. 222 (P.C. 1888). (Recovery was not allowed where there
had been no physical impact upon plaintiff's person and where the physical
injuries resulted solely from nervous shock caused by fear of being run
down by defendant's train.); Smith v. Johnson & Co. (1897) (unreported
but cited in Wilkinson v. Downtown, [1897] 2 Q.B. 57, 61.) (Recovery was
not permitted for physical injuries resulting from shock upon witnessing the
negligent killing by defendant of a stranger, plaintiff not having been in the
zone of peril.) ; Dulieu v. White & Sons [1901] 2 K.B. 669. (Recovery was
allowed for injury induced by shock when defendant negligently drove a
wagon into plaintiff's house, the plaintiff having been in the zone of peril.
Kennedy, J., said: "The shock . . . must be a shock which arises from a
reasonable fear of immediate personal injury to oneself." Id. at 675.). The
preceding statement of Kennedy, J., was disapproved of in the Hambrook
decision. Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., [1925] 1 K.B. 141, 150, 157 (1924).
See also 2 CAMB. L.J. 247 (1925).
9. Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., [1925] 1 K.B. 151, 157 (1924).
10. [1939] 1 K.B. 394 (1938).
11. Hay or Bourhill v. Young, [1942] 2 All E.R. 396.
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the scope of that duty is limited to what the defendant reasonably
could have foreseen. 12 Another familiar line of reasoning is
couched in terms of proximate cause: The defendant's act or
omission is the proximate cause of the injury which the plaintiff
suffered if the plaintiff (or the harm to the plaintiff) was reason-
ably foreseeable. 13 The ostensible decision then in many of theze
cases is as to whether the plaintiff (or the harm to him) was
reasonably foreseeable, and on that issue the English courts have
extended liability further than the American courts.
The problem inherent in these rationales is the difficulty in set-
ting up standards 4 by which foreseeability can be determined. 15
The outstanding feature of both the Waube decision and the
principal case is that the courts in both instances threw aside
such traditional verbiage and frankly stated what perhaps was
the real reason behind all the other decisions in this area of tort
law.'" They here found no duty, not because of any lack of the
12. For example, see the case of Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y.
339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), where Cardozo, J., analyzed the problem of the
unforeseeable plaintiff in terms of the relative duty concept, and cast aside
the arguments and distinctions which had developed around proximate
cause. This approach is precisely illustrated in the principal case, Resavage
v. Davies, 86 A.2d 879 (1952): "We think the fundamental consideration is
the extent of the duty owed ... ." Id. at 881. The same approach was taken
in Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935): "The problem
must be approached at the outset from the viewpoint of the duty of de-
fendant and the right of plaintiff, and not from the viewpoint of proximate
cause." Id. at 605, 258 N.W. at 497.
13. For example, see Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App. Div: 791 792,
148 N.Y. Supp. 39, 40 (1st Dep't 1914) ; Carey v. Pure Distributing Corp.,
133 Tex. 31, 35, 124 S.W.2d 847, 849 (1939).
14. For example, the court in the principal case was faced with the
problem of setting up a standard: "... We see no logical reason for holding
that liability does not extend to bystanders or persons less closely related
than child or spouse, but may extend to a child or spouse .... " Resavage
v. Davies, 86 A.2d 879, 883 (Md. 1952).
15. No problem is solved by substituting a similar word such as remote-
ness for foreseeability, as some of the English cases have done. Hay or
Bourhill v. Young, [1942] 2 All E.R. 396; Smith v. Johnson & Co. (1897)(unreported but cited in Wilkinson v. Downtown [1897] 2 Q.B. 57, 61).
16. Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935):
... The answer to this question [of liability] cannot be reached
solely by logic, nor is it clear that it can be entirely disposed of by a
consideration of what the defendant ought reasonably to have antici-
pated as a consequence of his wrong. The answer must be reached by
balancing the social interests involved in order to ascertain how far
defendant's duty and plaintiff's right may justly and expediently be
extended.... [If liability is imposed, it] would put an unreasonable
burden on users of the highway, open the way to fraudulent claims,
and enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point.
Id. at 613, 258 N.W. at 501.
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element of foreseeability, but because they simply could not, as a
matter of justice and fairness to all the parties involved, extend
liability to include such a situation. It is a policy decision, and
the court so states. Such an analysis is commendable and far
more to be desired than decisions which cover up the real rea-
sons behind the result with terms the ultimate definition of
which depends upon those undisclosed policy factors.Y
TORTS-RIGHT OF PRIVACY-NO RIGHT OF RECOVERY FOR
PUBLICATION CONCERNING DECEASED RELATIVES
Defendant newspaper published a report of the death of Ben
Milner in an automobile accident, describing the accident, and
mentioning the fact that he was one of a group of men who had
been indicted for theft. The deceased's widow, son and parents
instituted an action, claiming that the report violated their right
of privacy. Defendant moved for a summary judgment in the
The principal case, Resavage v. Davies, 86 A.2d 879 (Md. 1952), is to
the same effect:
* . . If such a rule [of liability] were adopted it would involve a tre-
mendous extension of liability to the world at large, not justified by
the best considered authorities.
Id. at 883.
The English courts show both sides of the argument. In Dulieu v. White
& Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669, Kennedy, J., stated:
I . . I should be sorry to adopt a rule which would bar all such
claims on grounds of policy alone, and in order to prevent the possible
success of unrighteous or groundless actions. Such a course involves
the denial of redress in meritorious cases, and it necessarily implies a
certain degree of distrust, which I do not share, in the capacity of legal
tribunals to get at the truth in this class of claims.
Id. at 681. In Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., [1925] 1 K.B. 141 (1924), Atkin,
L.J., said:
. . It may be that to negative Kennedy J.'s restriction [i.e., the
statement in the Dulieu case that the plaintiff must have suffered ap-
prehension for herself, not for another, in order to recover for resultant
physical injuries] is to increase possible actions. I think this may be
exaggerated.
Id. at 158. In his dissent in the same case, Sargant, L. J., argued:
*.. [lit would be a considerable and unwarranted extension of the
duty of owners of vehicles towards others in or near the highway, if
it were held to include an obligation not to do anything to render them
liable to harm through nervous shock caused by the sight or apprehen-
sion of damage to third person.
.. And the extent of this extra liability is necessarily both wide
and indefinite....
Id. at 163.
17. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 312, comment e, 313, caveat (1934). It is
interesting to note that the RESTATEMENT has refused to take a stand on
the question whether or not the scope of liability as drawn in the American
cases, or in the English cases, is correct.
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